Abstract: Against the background of ongoing biodiversity loss and ecosystem degradation, there is a need for more conservation efforts at all governance levels that also take into account the needs of subnational governments, cities and other local authorities. This paper presents a rationale for includingecologicalindicatorsinintergovernmentalfiscaltransfersthatredistributepublicrevenuefrom national and regional state governments to decentralised governments. Although recommended for introductioninanumberofEuropeancountries(suchasGermanyandPoland),todateonlyPortugal andtosomeextentFrancehaveimplementedfiscaltransfersforbiodiversityconservationinEurope. Inthispaperweprovide,first,areviewofexistingandproposedschemesacrossEurope,classifying them in relation to the stages of a policy cycle. Second, we identify critical design features of eco logical fiscal transfers (EFT) in order to develop recommendations for improving existing or introducing new EFT schemes.
Addressing the costs of local conserva tion action
Against the backdrop of an alarming rate of global biodiversity loss and ecosystem degradation (e. g. Butchart et al. 2010) , the Convention on Biological Diversity's (CBD) strategic plan for biodiversity 2011-2020 calls for further positive incentives for biodiversity conservation and the mobilisation of financial resources to implement biodiversity targets effectively (cBD 2010) . One of the key domains of conservation action is the local level. Hence the strategic plan explicitlyacknowledgesthefiscalneedsofsubnational governments, cities and other local authorities in this regard.
Multi-level governance has long been identified as a major issue in improving biodiversity conservation policies (Paavola et al. 2009; ring 2008a) . A thorough understanding of administrative governance structures and active involvement by local-level governments are critical factors in the success of conservation policies (Brechin et al. 2002; Grodzińska-Jurczak/cent 2011b; WätzolD et al. 2010; Becken/JoB 2014) .
In Europe, the Natura 2000 network of protected areas (PA) established under the Habitats Dir ective (ec 2011a) is the centrepiece of nature conservation and biodiversity policy. Its aim is to assure the long-term survival of Europe's most valuable and threatened species and habitats. However, decisions about where PA are to be sited are frequently taken at higher levels of government whereas the costs of withholding such areas from other socially and economically beneficialusesarebornebylocalgovernments and communities (see for a literature review on costs and benefits at different governmental levels Mayer/JoB 2014). While there are numerous ways to compensate private land users for such losses (e. g. payments for environmental services (PES) or agri-environment schemes), no financial incentives exist to offset the conservation costs incurred by public stakeholders (ring 2008a). Hence there is an emerging rationale for using ecologicalfiscaltransfers (EFT) togivelocalgovernmentsthefinancialresources they require to maintain or enhance biodiversity conservation and ecosystem services within PA whose environmental benefits extend beyond municipal boundaries.
The aim of this paper is twofold. First, it provides a review of existing and proposed schemes across Europe, while classifying them along the stages of a conceptual policy cycle. Second, it identifies critical design features of EFT and develops recommendations for advancing its design and implementation depending on their current stage in the policy cycle.
Ecological fiscal transfers (EFT) in the policy cycle
Fiscal transfer schemes redistribute public revenue from national and regional state governments to decentralised governments. A major aim of these transfers is to provide lower-tier governments with the revenue needed to cover their expenditure on public goods and services. InEuropeintergovernmentalfiscaltransfersaccount for up to 46 % of subnational expenditure, while in developing and transition economies they can be as much as 60 % of subnational expenditure (shah 2007) . Another purpose of such schemes is to compensate decentralised governments for expenditure incurred in providing public goods and services that have spillover benewwfitsinareasbeyondtheirboundaries,aswith health or education services, for example (olson 1969) .Thebulk offiscal transfersare distributed as lump-sum or general purpose (unconditional) transfers, i. e. the recipient government is free to decide how to use them and thus retains local autonomy. In many countries, subnational governments' fiscal capacity (own source publicrevenue)andfiscalneed(basedonspecified indicators such as population or area) determine the transfer amount received, constituting a distributiveelementknownas"fiscalequalisation". Inaddition,therearespecific(earmarkedorconditional) transfers that are allocated for the provision of certain public goods and services only.
More recently, scholars have begun to analyse biodiversity and ecosystem services in terms of their contribution to human well-being and to assess the economic costs and benefits associated with business as usual compared to timely environmental action, e. g. in combating climate change or halting biodiversity loss (stern 2007; TEEB 2010 TEEB , 2011 . In this context, an emerging rationale for EFT is given by the spatially unequal distributionofcostsandbenefitsassoci atedwith biodiversity conservation. Biodiversity-related fiscaltransfersareapowerfulmeansofreconciling the conservation costs encountered at local levelwiththebenefitsofbiodiversityconservation at higher levels of governance. EFT are thus seen as an innovative policy instrument for providing incentives to local governments to maintain or increase biodiversity conservation activitieswhichprovideecologicalbenefitstosociety in general (ring 2008a; ring et al. 2011; teeB 2011) .Inthe1990sBrazilbecamethefirstcoun-try to introduce EFT (ICMS Ecológico) to compensate municipalities for land-use restrictions imposed by PA (May et al. 2002; ring 2008c) . In 2007 Portugal introduced a PA-related indicator to redistribute tax rev enues from the national to the local level (santos et al. 2012a) . France compensates municipalities lying within the core areas of national parks and marine natural parks (Borie et al. 2014) . In other European countries, EFT have been proposed and, in some cases, modelled (SRU 1996; köllner et al. 2002; ring 2002 , 2008b schröter-schlaack et al. 2013) .
In this article, we discuss the development of EFT in four European countries, namely Portugal, France, Germany and Poland. We do so by reference to the "policy cycle", a standard concept in political science used to describe the development of a policy item stepwise from initial problem identification and agenda setting through to the evaluation and revision stage ( everett 2003; hoWarD 2005; skok 1995) . Here we use a conceptualisation described by uneP (2009) based on howlett/raMesh (2003) (see Tab. 1).
In the context of public policy making, an agenda is a list of issues or problems to which governmentofficialsattendatgiventimes.Thus, problem identification and agenda setting is a process in which policy initiators (e. g. local, regional state and national policy makers, administrators, scholars, lobbyists or NGO representatives) put forward arguments around specific issues to gain politicians' attention. In the context of EFT, then, it is sensible to target relevant policy initiators, who may differ from country to country. In all four countries analysed, EFT have made it onto the policy agenda.
Policy formulation is a process of generating policyoptionsinresponsetoaspecificproblem. In this process, policy formulators -both inside and outside government -identify and formalise policy options to prepare the ground for the decision-making stage. For EFT, this includes proposing the type of indicators to be used for Heft 2-3 / 2014 redistributing tax revenues, the potential addressees to be included in the scheme at relevant governance levels and the eligible recipients of EFTgiventhevariousobjectivesoffiscaltransfer schemes. Decision making can be described as a stage where a decision maker selects a course of action from among a small set of policy options identifiedatthepolicyformulationstageinview of policy implementation. Decision making is a highly sensitive matter, as the chosen course of action may potentially create winners and losers; this applies even in cases where no action is taken, i. e. when retaining the status quo. It can also be highly technical due to the complexity of the factors involved in assessing and comparing policy options based on their projected consequences.
Implementation is the stage where a selected policy option is translated into action. Failures in implementation often result in policies performing far below expectation. Compared with other, completely new environmental economic instruments, introducing EFT only involves modifyinganexistingfiscaltransferscheme.Nevertheless, it can be a huge challenge to obtain reliable comparable data suited to regularly updating conservation indicators at the relevant government levels and thereby giving decentralised governments an ongoing incentive to intensify conservation efforts. Furthermore, there may be a substantial time lag between implementation and clear policy outcomes, as the Portuguese case demonstrates.
Evaluationrefers to the effort to monitor how a policy has fared during implementation. Evalu- Thesefivekeystagesinthepolicycyclearelisted in Tab. 1 in order to showcase the experience with EFT in the four European countries selected,namely,Portugal,France,Germany,andPoland. These countries were chosen as they are all EuropeanUnion member states, and either have EFT already implemented or the introduction of ecologicalindicatorsintothefiscaltransfersystem is debated among policymakers. In the next section, we analyse in more detail existing or proposed EFT schemes for each country.
Tab. 1:Ecologicalfiscaltransfers(EFT)inthepolicycycleinfourEuropeancountries

Review of EFT across Europe
Portugal-evaluatingarecentnationwide EFTscheme
Portugal is divided into 308 municipalities that form 18 districts on the mainland and two auto nomous regions, the Azores and Madeira archipelagos (Instituto Nacional de Estatística 2013). In 2007, Portugal integrated EFT into annual transfers from the national general budget to the municipalities in order to compensate for land-use restrictions imposed by PA and Natura 2000 sites (santos et al. 2012a) . EFT were introduced via approval of the revised LocalFinancesLaw (LFL), which sets out the general principles and rules for fiscal transfers from the national government level to the local level (municipalities). Portugal thus became the firstEuropeanUnion (EU) member state to acknowledge Natura 2000 sites and other national PA as indicators for the redistribution of public revenues from central to local governments -a landmark in European biodiversity policy. The newly introduced Article 6 of the LFL, which promotes local sustainability, states that "the financialregimeofmunicipalitiesshallcontribute to the promotion of economic development, environmental protection and social welfare". This general objective is supported by several mechanisms, including positive discrimination in fund allocation for municipalities with land designated as Natura 2000 sites or other national PA.
The ecological criteria contained in the amended law are "total area under protection" and "percentage of municipal land designated as PA" (santos et al. 2012a) . These are among the set of indicators used to determine the distribution of the General Municipal Fund (FGM), which makes up 50 % of the Financial Equilibrium Fund (FEF). The FGM is allocated to municipalities as follows: 5 % is distributed equally among all municipalities; 65 % is allocated as a function of population density (weighted in order to benefit less populated municipalities) and of the average number of overnight stays in hotels or on campsites; the remaining 30 % is distributed according to 1) the municipalities' total area and 2) the amount of land designated as conservation area (Natura 2000 sites or any other national PA):
-in municipalities with less than 70 % of their territory under Natura 2000 or other PA, 25 % of FGM is allocated in proportion to area, weighted by elevation levels, and 5 % in proportion to land designated as conservation area;
-in municipalities with more than 70 % of their territory under Natura 2000 or other PA, 20 % of FGM is allocated in proportion to area, weighted by elevation levels, and 10 % in proportion to land designated as conservation area.
The principle adopted for these fiscal transfers is non-earmarking, meaning they are lump-sum transfers:thelocalgovernmentbeneficiariesare free to decide upon their use. Intergovernmental fiscaltransfersareanimportantrevenuesource for Portuguese municipalities, although their relativeimpactvariessignificantly.In2008,the shareoffiscaltransfersasaproportionoftotal municipal budget varied from 25 % in Lisboa to 97%inBarrancos.Onaverage,theshareoffiscal transfers as a proportion of total municipal revenues is around 60 %, revealing that municipalitiesdependsignificantlyonnationalfunding. Thus any major changes in the LFL allocation criteria are relevant to municipal development strategies (santos et al. 2012a ).
When evaluating the recently implemented EFT scheme, a number of factors need to be taken into account. The 2007 amendments to the LFL relate to various funds and allocation criteria (e. g., changes in the population criterion weighting). This gave rise to several crossover effects that hadsignificantimplicationsforthefinalalloca-tion of transfers to each municipality. In order to assessthefinancialimpactsofthenewLFL,real transfers in 2008 and 2009 were compared to estimated transfers for the same years under the old criteria (santos et al. 2012b ). This comparison makes it possible to identify which municipalities won or lost under the new law ( Fig. 1 ).
In 2008, 43 % of all Portuguese municipalities wonwiththenewLFL,withVilaNovadeGaia being the one with the highest gain at 2.8 %. By contrast, Castro Marim bore the highest loss at −10.3%. In 2009, there were slight changes: 45 % of all municipalities won with the new criteria; however, wins and losses were more significant.Themaximumgainwas5.3%forLou-resandthemajorloss−22.8%forÓbidos.
Using a sample of just four municipalities with more and four with less than 70 % of municipal area as designated conservation area (Tab. 2), it is possible to verify that, in 2008, the differences in actual transfers received were not very significant compared to the old LFL criteria; only Vila do Bispo loses 5.9 %, while all the other municipalities vary between −1% and 1 %. Among the municipalities with more than 70 % of designated conservation area, only one wins with the new LFL criteria. This indicates that the introduction of the ecological indicator wasnotsufficienttocounterbalanceothercrossover effects (e. g., the increase in weighting of theFGMpopulationcriterion-see,forexample, Lisboa as a winner of the new LFL despite hav- ing 0 % designated conservation area) or provide a higher incentive to those municipalities with a larger proportion of PA. Nevertheless, the detailed analysis by santos et al. (2012a) shows that all municipalities with more than 70 % of their territory under conservation would lose out if the new LFL were to be applied without the ecological criterion.
To analyse in more detail the ecological component introduced with the new LFL, Tab. 3 shows the EFT allocated to a sample of municipalities with more than 70 % of designated conservation areas, their share in proportion to total municipal fiscaltransfers,andtheirshareinproportionto In conclusion, EFT implemented via the new LFL positively discriminate municipalities with a high percentage of designated conservation area. However, the introduction of the ecologic- alcriterionwasnotsufficienttocounterbalance othercrossovereffects,therebynegatingthefinancial incentive offered to municipalities by the ecologicalindicator.Duetothesignificantnumber of changes introduced, the ecological component is difficult to grasp by the stakeholders concerned and thus poses no greater incentive for conservation (santos et al. 2012a) . It is also not clear whether current EFT can compensate for the opportunity costs incurred by municipalities. Finally, this mechanism is too new to enable an evaluation of ecological effectiveness in relation to its direct or indirect impacts on PA management, biodiversity conservation or ecosystem services provision. Nonetheless, it may be an important step in changing the mindset of decision makers.
France-evaluatinganexistingsmallscale system
In addition to the tax breaks and incentives provided to private land users with land belonging to Natura 2000 sites (e. g., BulletinOfficieldesImpôts2007a,b),theexistingFrenchfiscaltransfer system(DGF)introducedin1979wasamended in2006tobetterreflectthecoststomunicipal-ities of setting up and managing PA (Borie et al. 2014) . Since 2003, a principle of equality between local authorities has been inserted into the French Constitution which states (article 72.2) that "local authorities have resources that they can allocate as they wish in the conditions determined by the law (…) [and that] the law provides equalisation mechanisms so as to favour equality between local authorities". Hence, the DGF is considered to be an important equalisation mechanism between local authorities in terms of public spending (GuenGant/Josselin 2006).In2011theDGFdevotedtomunicipali-ties was represented by two main components:
(1) a lump-sum allocation representing more than 85 % of the total amount to be distributed and (2) an equalisation allocation. The lumpsumallocationhasfivemainelements:
(1) A base-line amount depending on the number of inhabitants in the municipality of up to 128 € per inhabitant.
(2) An amount proportional to the surface area of the municipality and the region where it occurs. Regular areas receive 3.22 € per hectare, mountain areas 5.37 € per hectare, while overseas territories receive three times the regular amount per hectare.
(3) An amount aimed at compensating municipalities for the loss or reduction of other sources of income (such as the professional tax).
(4) A complementary allocation that seeks to stabilise the amount of the lump-sum allocation.
(5)An"ecologicalallocation"formunicipalities that lie within national parks or natural marine parks, representing the French EFT.
The equalisation allocation is based on the principle of solidarity. It seeks to compensate differences between rural and urban areas and between municipalities with a fiscal capacity lower than the national average. With the adoption of the law on national parks, natural marine parks and regionalparksin2006,apartoftheDGFallocation to municipalities depends on whether they are located in the core area of a national park (General Code for Local Authorities, article L2334-7). The scheme is based on the idea of "ecological solidarity" (Mathevet et al. 2010) , meaning that these municipalities are compen sated for the opportunity costs of conservation imposed by the land-use restrictions associated with strictly protected areas. The ecological allocation received is based on the following formula: In 2010, the total amount of EFT allocated to municipalities was 3.1 m €. In 2011, it was decided that insular cities located in natural marine parks couldalsobenefitfromthisscheme.Althoughthe Frenchfiscaltransfersystemtakesaccountofsocio-economic inequalities among municipalities, EFT in France remain marginal. In March 2008, it was estimated that there are 36 783 municipalities in the French territory, 25 000 of which have fewer than 700 inhabitants (BonnarD 2009); only 150 municipalities were eligible for the "eco logical allocation". Thus in 2011, although a total of 13.6 bn € were allocated to French municipalities via the DGF, only 0.02% of this amount was allocated on the basis of ecological considerations (i. e. to municipalities that are part of a core area of a national park or marine park).
In the course of implementing the current outcomes of the environment roundtable (Grenelle de l'environnement), participants are exploring whether to extend the French EFT scheme to municipalities with other PA or sensitive areas. Theideaistointroducea"biodiversitycrite rion" in addition to existing criteria when allocating money to municipalities. In this context, Borie et al. (2014) have studied various simulations for the Mediterranean region of southern France, a major biodiversity hotspot subject to increasing threats to biodiversity. They examined two redistributivemethodsforEFTcalculation:first,a "perhectare"method,basedonthesurfacearea of the PA within municipal boundaries and, second, a "population equivalent" method, where the surface area of PA is converted through weightings into virtual numbers of inhabitants.
Results show that, depending on the weights introduced, the population equivalent method can provide a strong incentive to encourage municipalities to designate PA, although larger municipalities with low shares of PA in proportion to theirterritorywouldlosemoresignificantly.
The French DGF is a major instrument for mitigating inequalities between municipalities. SincePAprovidebenefitstosocietyingeneral, furthergreeningofthefiscaltransfersystemis consistent with the underlying philosophy of theDGF.Enlargingthecurrentsmall-scaleEFT could thus be used to recognise the efforts made by municipalities at the local level and to contribute to putting the concept of ecological solidarity into practice among different territories (Mathevet et al. 2010; thoMpson et al. 2011) . By encouraging and rewarding PA designation and management, EFT could enhance society's commitment to conservation and intensify local stewardship. However, there is no direct link between the EFT and environmental activities, as transfers from the MunicipalGeneralFund are not earmarked (Borie et al. 2014) . For averagesized municipalities, overall transfers generally constitute a significant share of the budget so that the EFT portion is rarely visible. For small municipalities with only 100-500 inhabitants, however, the ecological allocation may representasignificantproportionofthebudget.Thus EFT in France have highly varied effects on municipalities while their environmental impacts are neither clear nor uniform.
Germany-choosingindicatorstomodel EFToptionsatregionalstateandlocallevels
Germany is a federal state comprising 16 regionalstates("Bundesländer")and11220muni-cipalities (Statistisches Bundesamt 2013). 
Poland -gettingEFTontothepoliticalagenda
In Poland, the implementation of the EU Habitat and Birds Directives has caused much controversy among local policymakers and communities. The designation of Natura 2000 sites and the establishment of monitoring rules have primarily followed expert advice commissioned by the MinistryoftheEnvironment, almost excluding local governments from the process (Bell et al. 2008; BoltroMiuk 2010; cent et al. 2007 ; DuBel 2010). There has been little public partici pation or consultation with relevant stakeholders from local communities at the implementation stage of Natura 2000, i. e. the development of management plans for each protected site (Grodzińska-Jurczak/cent 2010, 2011b).
The Polish Association of Presidents and
Mayors, whose boroughs include Natura 2000 sites, have lodged an official complaint about this. They have expressed discontent about the short timescales given to formulate opinions about preliminary site borders, the use of purely scientific criteria for selecting the PA (margin- Eventually, the majority of borough councils argued against the way the Natura 2000 network was to be implemented over the country (Grodzińska-Jurczak et al. 2012) . In this situation, a bottom-up initiative of local governments has proposed an EFT scheme for Polish boroughs. 
Discussion of critical design features of EFT
Based on experience with the schemes implemented in Portugal and France as well as on the schemes proposed in Germany and Poland this section highlights six critical EFT design features. One key distinction between EFT schemes is the type of costs or benefitsto be acknowledged (ring et al. 2011) . One type are management costs, i. e. actual government spending on nature conservation. Compensation for opportunity costs, i. e. the tax revenue foregone due to limited economic opportunities in PA, constitutes another cost type. The latter is the principle adopted for the Portuguese EFT scheme, although no actual opportunity costs have been estimated. These costs are also envisaged in Poland. Lastly, transferscouldalsobejustifiedbythespilloverbenefitsPAsprovide.Publicexpenditureonconservationmaybeeasiertoascertainfromofficialstatistics and thus be more transparent. It may also be more uniform across decentralised jurisdictions compared to opportunity costs or spillover benefits. From a theoretical economic point of view, PA are considered to have no or at most very low opportunity costs once land has been granted official,legallybindingPAdesignation,butthisis highly contested from the practical perspective of the stakeholders affected. PA opportunity costs or spillover benefits may be a strong argument in political debates, though they create methodological challenges in terms of measurement and, depending on the country in question, the legal constraints on transfers (e. g. Möckel 2013).
Options for the typeofindicators used to distribute transfers include quantitative indicators, such as surface area of PA or money spent on nature conservation measures, and qualitative indicators, such as PA quality, connectivity of the landscape, management measures carried out, or ecosystem services provided. Quantitative indicators are usually easier to measure and more transparent; however, they may not adequatelyreflecttheconservationeffectivenessof the measures. One way to alleviate this problem is to introduce weightings for different PA categories, favouring stricter PA categories with higher land-use restrictions, as is already practised in Brazilian states and has been proposed for Germany (May et al. 2002; ring 2008b) . Another are direct PA quality indicators to mirror conservation effectiveness, although regular monitoring poses challenges, characteristics that raise the trans action costs of implementing EFT. Quantitative and qualitative indicators can also complement each other to reflect differences in nature conservation activities between transfer recipients (for Germany, see schröter-schlaack et al. 2013). In general there is a trade-off between the ecological accuracy of indicators and the reduced complexity required for calculating transfers based on available data, as well as restrictions established by constitutional laws.Forexample,theGermanconstitutionrequires indicators to be abstract, general and not prone to influence by the recipients of fiscal transfers (e. g., Möckel 2013). In this respect, the area covered by Natura 2000 sites as a proportion of total area in the eligible jurisdictions is a promising approach at European level. Both SpecialAreasofConservation designated under the Habitats Directive and Special Protection Areas designated under the BirdsDirectivefulfil specificcriteriawithregardtonatureconservation at European level -and are essentially beyondtheinfluenceoflocalandregionalpolicymakers in receipt of EFT. Furthermore, Article 17 of the Habitats Directive requires Member
States to report every six years on progress made with implementing the Directive. Data collected at subnational levels to feed into national reporting could be used to design qualitative indicators based on actual performance of the Natura 2000 sites.
Another distinction is the scale of the scheme, i. e. the number of decentralised governments thatcanbenefitfromEFT.Thisclearlydepends on the ecological indicators chosen. In the French transfer system, only those local governments lying within the core areas of national parks or natural marine parks receive EFT. In Portugal, Natura 2000 and other national PA are included, leading to a much higher number of beneficiaries among Portuguese municipalities. In a pilot phase, schemes could operate with fewer indicators and recipients to test and evaluate their effects before scaling them up. Naturally, the impact of mainstreaming biodiversity conservation will increase as more decentralised governments become eligible to receive EFT. Again, Natura 2000 sites would provide an excellent indicator for national EFT schemes in the EuropeanUnionsincetheymakeupasignificant proportion of the national territory of EU member states (see Tab. 4).
The origin or type of funds to be allocated represents another important criterion for EFT. EFTdesignsliketheonesproposedinGermany follow a general approach and place ecological indicators side by side with indicators for other public responsibilities, such as number of inhabitants, surface area or topographical criteria (mountainous regions). One could also reserve a fixedamountorshareofthetotalavailabletransfer budget that is then distributed exclusively according to ecological indicators, as in Portugal. This latter approach would reduce the budget available for other criteria. Both approaches will An overview of how the EFT schemes and proposalspresentedabovecouldbeclassifiedonthe basisofthecriticaldesignfeaturesidentifiedis provided in Tab. 5. Recommendations regarding which option is preferable will depend on the legal and institutional framework of each country, the number of jurisdictions involved and the governmental level at which the EFT scheme is to be implemented, the other instruments for biodiversity conservation and ecosystem service management in place, and the status of fiscal transfers in the policy cycle. Beyond national and marine nature parks, France is considering scaling up its existing limited EFT system to include other types of PA that also impose management costs on local authorities and land-use restrictions on private land users. A promising approach could be to include Natura 2000 sites. Nevertheless, the conditions for a socially and environmentally soundredistributionoffiscaltransferstoprovide direct incentives for PA designation require further debate. More research is needed to assess the potential positive and adverse effects of EFT in diverse ecological and social contexts. Whatever EFT allocation formula is to be adopted, it should be monitored carefully and decision makersshouldremainflexibleandabletorevise EFT schemes that appear unequal or less effective than initially expected (Borie et al. 2014) .
The roads ahead: Recommendations for different stages in the policy cycle
In Germany the main task is to get EFT into the policy arena. Further design options are to be explored to spur political debate. This includes different or additional ecological indicators, various ways of integrating ecological indicators into the existing transfer schemes as well as evaluating the compatibility of these options with the constitutionalrulesforfiscaltransfers.Awindowof opportunity for EFT at the federal level is about to emerge with the phasing out of the Solidarity Pact II by 2019. Under this regulation, East German regional states and Berlin receive supplementary federal grants to overcome structural underdevelopment resulting from the partitioning of Germany. The upcoming reform of the currentfiscaltransfersystemfrom2020onwards is already being widely discussed both by fed- In Poland,conflictsaroundthelackofcompensation programmes for lost income due to landuse restrictions in PA cannot be halted or resolved within the next few years while the detailed management plans for all Natura 2000 sites are beingdeveloped.However,financialbackingis crucial for local governments who incur actual Natura 2000 management costs. Furthermore, compensation for the public (and private) opportunity costs of conservation may foster effective implementation of the conservation network. Without accurate data on boroughs' and individual owners' costs -the latter have never been assessed -the recently proposed Ecological Subsidies Act cannot be calculated precisely. So far, there is neither an agreed EFT concept in Poland nor consensus among those proposing such initiatives. Solving these problems will require close cooperation between all levels of the administration (hogl et al. 2012) and support from political majorities in the parliament. No matter what EFT design is eventually developed, more information is required on how to manage Natura 2000 sites and PA locally. A limited number of such information programmes have been implemented so far, all of which have been successful (kronenBerG/BerGier 2010). Both financial and information-related solutions for Poland should be backed up by tried-and-tested international know-how.
Conclusion
Inviewofthefiscalneedsresultingfromlocal conservation actions, practitioners and scholars across Europe are discussing the potential benefitsofintegratingecologicalindicatorsintofiscal transfer schemes. Such EFT could provide subnational governments, cities and other local authorities with the (additional) funds they need for conservation activities. Moreover, by spotlighting nature conservation as an important publicresponsibilityeligibleforfiscaltransfers, EFT may also help to mainstream biodiversity conservation in regional state and local development policies. The major drivers of biodiversity loss imposed by local development, such as habi tat destruction through urban sprawl, infrastructuredevelopmentandland-useintensification, could thus be counterbalanced.
We have reviewed the state of EFT schemes in four European countries at different stages in the policy cycle. We have discussed critical design features of EFT schemes in order to distil lessons learned and recommendations for improving EFT. Promising avenues for future EFT design and implementation include transfers based on qualitative indicators, alongside the quantitative PA-based indicators currently in use in Portugal and France. Further challenges lie in addressing the sustained provision of ecosystem services, e.g., based on a quantification of ecosystem services as provided by Maes et al. (2011) for Europe. It will be interesting to observe how this issue develops further in relation to member states' uptake of the EU BiodiversityStrategy, in particular target 2 action 5 on mapping and assessing the state of ecosystems and their services by 2014 and promoting the integration of their values into accounting and reporting systems at EU and national level by 2020 (EC 2011b). Recent research in Portugal has explored the inclusion of ecosystem services in EFT (santos et al. 2012b) , and it will be interesting to follow the evolution of this pioneering scheme.
DespitepromisingoptionsforEFT,fiscaltransfersarefirstandforemostadistributiveinstrument to level out vertical and horizontal differences in public budgets available to subnational governments.Hence,fundingviafiscaltransfers typically depends on a number of different criteria, most of them related to economic and social rather than environmental and conservation objectives. Nevertheless, EFT close an obvious gap in the conservation policy mix in many countries by drawing public policymakers' attention to economic incentives for nature conservation.
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